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Abstract 
Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve a 
successful theory, T. I object that this contention places upon him the burden of showing that 
scientific antirealists’ favorite arguments, such as the pessimistic induction, do not rationally 
compel us to disbelieve T. Van Fraassen uses the English view of rationality to rationally 
disbelieve T. I argue that realists can use it to rationally believe T, despite scientific 
antirealists’ favorite arguments against T. 
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1. Introduction 
Scientific realism affirms, whereas scientific antirealism denies, that a successful theory, T, is 
(approximately) true. Hilary Putnam (1975) and Bas van Fraassen’s (2007, 2017) positions fit 
these definitions of scientific realism and antirealism, respectively. This paper concerns the 
question: Can we rationally believe T? One might suspect that scientific realists would 
answer “Yes,” whereas scientific antirealists would answer “No.” Van Fraassen’s (2007, 
2017) answer, however, is not as simple as it initially appears. He disbelieves T, but claims 
that we can rationally believe T. How can he disbelieve T, and yet contend that we can 
rationally believe T? The answer lies in his appeal to the English view of rationality (EVR). 
This paper aims to show that scientific realists can also invoke the EVR to overcome 
scientific antirealists’ objections to scientific realism, such as the pessimistic induction. In 
Section 2, I unpack the EVR, contrasting it with the Prussian view of rationality (PVR). In 
Section 3, I expound how van Fraassen (2017) utilizes the EVR to respond to David Papineau 
(2007) and Alan Musgrave (2017). In addition, I argue that van Fraassen’s response to these 
scientific realists carries with it the burden of showing that scientific antirealists’ favorite 
arguments do not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. In Section 4, I argue that scientific 
realists can use the EVR to get around the pessimistic induction and the problem of 
unconceived alternatives (Stanford, 2006). In Section 5, I reply to an objection and answer 
two questions from two reviewers of this journal. 
This paper has a message to scientific antirealists who aim to strengthen scientific 
antirealism and weaken scientific realism: their insightful and sophisticated ideas might 
ironically be utilized by realists to strengthen scientific realism and to weaken scientific 
antirealism. 
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2. The Prussian and English Views of Rationality 
In this section, I expound two views of rationality, the PVR and the EVR, beginning with the 
PVR because it is more straightforward. 
The PVR holds that “what is rational to believe is exactly what one is rationally 
compelled to believe” (van Fraassen, 1989: 171). On this account, it is rational to believe T, 
only when we have an argument that rationally compels us to believe T. Without such an 
argument, it would be irrational for us to believe T. What if we have an argument that 
rationally compels us to disbelieve T? In such a case, it would be rational to disbelieve T, and 
irrational to believe T.  
By contrast, the EVR holds that “what it is rational to believe includes anything that 
one is not rationally compelled to disbelieve” (van Fraassen, 1989: 171–172). The converse 
aspect of the EVR is that what it is rational to disbelieve includes anything that one is not 
rationally compelled to believe. On this account, in the absence of an argument that rationally 
compels us to believe T, we can rationally disbelieve T, and in the absence of an argument 
that rationally compels us to disbelieve T, we can rationally believe T. In sum, without any 
argument that rationally compels us to either believe or disbelieve T, we can choose between 
belief and disbelief, and whichever we may choose, our stance is reasonable. 
Under the EVR, we can rationally believe T in the following two cases: First, we have 
an argument that rationally compels us to believe T. In such a case, we are rationally 
compelled to believe T, both under the EVR and the PVR. Second, we have no argument that 
rationally compels us to believe or disbelieve T. In such a case, the EVR allows us to 
rationally believe T.  
Under the EVR, we can rationally disbelieve T in the following two cases. First, we 
have an argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve T. In such a case, we are rationally 
compelled to disbelieve T, both under the EVR and the PVR. Second, there is no argument 
that rationally compels us to believe or disbelieve T. In such a case, the EVR allows us to 
rationally disbelieve T.  
 
3. Problems with Van Fraassen’s Use 
Van Fraassen adopts the EVR over the PVR. In this section, I explicate how he uses the EVR 
to develop his position and to cope with criticisms. I also argue that his position places upon 
him the burden of undermining the arguments that antirealists have constructed over the past 
several decades to refute realism. 
Is the belief of T reasonable? Van Fraassen thinks that there is no argument that 
rationally compels us to disbelieve T. Thus, under the EVR, we can rationally believe T. Is 
the disbelief of T reasonable? He thinks that abduction is a problematic rule of inference, so 
we do not have an argument that rationally compels us to believe T. Thus, under the EVR, we 
can rationally disbelieve T. The two considerations—the EVR and the absence of any 
rationally compelling argument for either the belief or disbelief of T—allow us to choose 
between believing or disbelieving T. Either choice is reasonable. 
Van Fraassen says that the belief of T is “supererogatory” (2007: 343, 2017: 99). What 
does it mean to say so? Let me use an analogy to answer this question. It is supererogatory 
for you to donate your entire salary to charity. It is moral for you to do so, but you do not 
need to do it. Even if you do not do it, no one can accuse you of being immoral. In short, it is 
beyond the call of morality for you to do it, i.e., morality does not require that you donate 
your entire salary to charity. Similarly, to say that it is supererogatory for you to believe T 
means that it is reasonable for you to believe T, but you do not need to do it. Even if we do 
not do it, no one can accuse us of being unreasonable. In short, it is beyond the call of 
rationality for you to do it, i.e., rationality does not require that you believe T. 
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Now that we are clear about van Fraassen’s position, we are ready to explore how he 
confronts criticisms from realists, such as Papineau and Musgrave. Papineau states, 
“According to van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ … we ought never to believe in the 
truth of any theory which goes beyond the observable phenomena” (1996: 8). Van Fraassen 
retorts repeatedly that “I do not advocate agnosticism about the unobservable, but claim that 
belief is supererogatory as far as science is concerned; you may if you like, but there is no 
need” (2007: 343, 2017: 99). Musgrave states that “it is reasonable to believe that H is true” 
(2017: 80). Van Fraassen replies that “such a belief is reasonable enough, but 
supererogatory” (2017: 102). We should keep two things in mind about van Fraassen’s 
position here. He disbelieves T on the grounds that his belief of T would be supererogatory. 
Thus, his position fits the definition of antirealism mentioned in Section 1. He contends, 
however, that we can reasonably choose either to believe or disbelieve T. 
Van Fraassen’s position would surprise both realists and antirealists. It would be 
surprising to realists that van Fraassen shares their view that we can rationally believe T. It 
would be surprising to antirealists that he disagrees with them over whether we have an 
argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve T. Over the past several decades, 
antirealists have raised forceful objections to realism, such as the pessimistic induction, non-
realist accounts of the success of science, and the problem of underdetermination. They 
constructed these objections to show that we are rationally compelled to disbelieve T. Van 
Fraassen’s position, however, implies that these objections do not rationally compel us to 
disbelieve T. So he has put himself in the ironic situation of having to attack these objections 
to show that they do not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. This ironic situation has been 
neglected in the literature, so it is worth exhibiting it in detail. 
The problem of underdetermination holds that T competes with rival theories, i.e., they 
make identical assertions about observables but different assertions about unobservables, so 
observation cannot tell us which is true and which others are false. Van Fraassen claims that 
we do not have an argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve T, which implies that 
even if T competes with empirically equivalent rivals, we are not rationally compelled to 
disbelieve T. Under these conditions, the EVR asserts that we can rationally believe T. Thus, 
it would be a mistake to attribute to him the reasoning that since T competes with empirically 
equivalent rivals, we cannot rationally believe T, and that we can only rationally believe that 
T is empirically adequate. Antirealists would wonder whether he is on their side or on the 
realists’ side.  
Antirealists have advanced many non-realist accounts of the success of science
1
 in 
order to undercut Hilary Putnam’s proposal that science is successful because “the theories 
accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true” (Putnam, 1975: 73). For 
example, Timothy Lyons (2003: 900, 2018: 147) proposes that T is successful because 
observational events occur as if T were true. Such non-realist explanations undermine the 
contention that realism best accounts for the success of science. Van Fraassen, however, 
claims that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve T, which implies that 
the non-realist explanations of the success of science do not rationally compel us to 
disbelieve T. Hence, under the EVR, the non-realist explanations are not obstacles to 
rationally believing T. Again, antirealists would wonder whether van Fraassen is on their side 
or on the realists’ side. 
Relatedly, van Fraassen (1980: 40) advances the selectionist account of the success of 
science to undercut Putnam’s realist account of the success of science. The selectionist 
explanation attributes the success of science to the fact that successful theories defeat 
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unsuccessful ones in the struggle for existence. What are we to make of this explanation? 
Even if it is a strong competitor to the realist explanation, it does not count as a rationally 
compelling argument for the disbelief of T. Hence, under the EVR, it is not an obstacle to 
rationally believing T. One may wonder what van Fraassen has achieved by advancing his 
selectionist account of the success of science. 
Let me turn to the pessimistic induction (PI). It holds that “we are in the midst of an 
ongoing historical process in which our theoretical conceptions of nature will continue to 
change just as profoundly and fundamentally as they have in the past” (Stanford, 2015: 875). 
To take an example: we believed that heat was caloric fluid. We now believe that it is the 
mean kinetic energy of molecules. Our theoretical conception of heat has undergone a 
profound and fundamental change. The PI implies that it will repeatedly undergo profound 
and fundamental changes. Similar stories can be given of other theories in science. The PI is 
endorsed by many scientists and philosophers, such as Henri Poincaré (1905/1952: 160) and 
Thomas Nickles (2017: 153). It is the most powerful argument against realism according to 
many participants in the realism debate, including John Worrall (1989: 101) and Howard 
Sankey (2017: 201). 
If the PI is cogent, we are rationally compelled to disbelieve T. After all, if T is fated to 
be thrown out, we are rationally compelled to disbelieve it. Surprisingly, however, van 
Fraassen claims that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve T, which 
implies that the PI does not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. It follows that the PI is not 
an obstacle to realists’ rationally believing T. 
How could van Fraassen show that the PI does not rationally compel us to disbelieve 
T? He could appeal to objections that realists have already raised in the literature.
2
 For 
example, he could appeal to the realist objection that the PI “commits the fallacy of biased 
statistics” (Park, 2018a: 11). He could then argue that since the PI is a fallacious argument, it 
does not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. Note that he has put himself into the ironic 
situation where he has to ally with realists in the fight against the PI. Perhaps this is the 
reason why he has been silent about the PI for the past several decades, even though it is 
generally regarded as the strongest objection to realism. 
Van Fraassen faces a dilemma with respect to the PI. He can say either that the PI 
rationally compels us to disbelieve T, or that it does not. If he says that it does, he cannot say 
to Papineau and Musgrave that he agrees that we can rationally believe T. On the other hand, 
if he says that it does not, he can say to Papineau and Musgrave that he agrees that we can 
rationally believe T. He would then, however, find himself in the ironic situation where he 
should ally with realists to undermine the PI. It is not clear how he would get around this 
dilemma. 
Similar dilemmas can be constructed against van Fraassen with respect to the problem 
of underdetermination and the non-realist explanations of the success of science. I, however, 
do not spell them out because they can be extrapolated from the one sketched above with 
respect to the PI. 
Van Fraassen might reply that even if the PI is cogent, we can nevertheless rationally 
believe T. In general, a cogent argument against T does not amount to an argument that 
rationally compels us to disbelieve T, and a cogent argument for T does not amount to an 
argument that rationally compels us to believe T. A cogent argument is not rationally 
compelling any more than abduction is rationally compelling. Since a cogent argument is not 
rationally compelling, the EVR implies that the PI against T, even if cogent, does not 
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rationally compel us to disbelieve T, and that we can rationally believe T. So might van 
Fraassen argue. 
It is not clear, however, that van Fraassen would go this far. Recall that he thinks that 
there is no argument that rationally compels us to believe T because he rejects abduction. The 
other side of the coin is that if he thought that abduction was a reliable rule of inference, he 
would think that we have an argument that rationally compels us to believe. Given that 
abduction can, at best, be cogent, he would take a cogent argument to be rationally 
compelling. 
Moreover, the following three problems would arise if van Fraassen were to take the 
position that a cogent argument does not amount to a rationally compelling argument. First, 
he would have to justify his position rather than merely stating it, and it is not clear what 
argument he could use to justify it. His critics would be interested in whether his argument is 
rationally compelling or not. Second, the PI is regarded as the strongest objection to realism. 
If such a cogent argument does not equal a rationally compelling argument for the disbelief 
of T, it is not clear whether there is any argument that would rationally compel us to 
disbelieve T. Thus, the prospect is dim that antirealists could ever come up with an argument 
that would bar realists from rationally believing T. Third, van Fraassen would have to 
provide at least one example of an argument that would rationally compel us to disbelieve T. 
Otherwise, it is empty of content to say that the PI does not rationally compel us to disbelieve 
T. 
In this section, I argued that van Fraassen’s position puts the burden on him of showing 
that antirealists’ objections to realism do not rationally compel us to disbelieve T. In the next 
section, I argue that realists can use the EVR to get around the two famous antirealist 
objections to realism, the PI and the PUA. 
 
4. Realists’ Uses 
4.1. The Pessimistic Induction 
One strategy to refute the PI is to say that current theories have higher predictive, 
explanatory, and manipulative powers than earlier ones (Musgrave, 1985; Mizrahi, 2013a). 
This difference between earlier and current theories motivates a view that I call empirical 
progressivism, which holds that new theories have greater predictive, explanatory, and 
manipulative powers than old theories. Empirical progressivism nullifies the PI. Since new 
theories are empirically better than old theories, we cannot infer the demise of the former 
from that of the latter. Consequently, we do not know whether current theories will undergo 
scientific revolutions. 
Empirical progressivism has elicited an apt antirealist response from Florian Müller, 
who states that it “is not at all obvious why science, or at least our current best theories, 
should have achieved a degree of success that warrants their truth” (Müller, 2015: 406). In 
other words, empirical progressivism does not show that present theories are plausible. It 
only shows that they are more plausible than their precursors. There is a huge difference 
between being plausible and being more plausible, as K. Brad Wray (2008: 323) and Moti 
Mizrahi (2013b: 401) note. The idea is that although T1 is more plausible than T2, both might 
be far from being plausible. Thus, realists have the burden of showing that present theories 
are successful enough to conclude that they are true. Müller’s challenge is quite a daunting 
one, and no realist has yet responded to it. 
In this context, the EVR can help realists. Empirical progressivism nullifies the PI, as 
noted above. Since the PI is fallacious, it is not an argument that rationally compels us to 
disbelieve current theories.  Moreover, Müller has no argument that rationally compels us to 
disbelieve that present theories are successful enough to conclude that they are true. Rather, 
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he merely challenges realists to prove that present theories are sufficiently successful. Under 
these circumstances, the EVR asserts that we can rationally believe that present theories are 
sufficiently successful, and hence that they are true. To block realists from rationally 
believing that current theories are sufficiently successful, Müller should present an argument 
that rationally compels them to disbelieve that current theories are sufficiently successful. 
Thanks to the EVR, realists do not need to prove that current theories are sufficiently 
successful. Realists can rationally believe that current theories are sufficiently successful 
without bearing the burden of proving it, as long as there is no argument that rationally 
compels them to disbelieve that they are sufficiently successful. Thus, antirealists should 
rather shoulder the burden of proving that realists are rationally compelled to disbelieve that 
current theories are sufficiently successful. In sum, realists can use the EVR to shift the 
burden of proof from them to their opponents. 
 
4.2. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives 
The PUA holds that “the history of scientific inquiry itself offers a straightforward rationale 
for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by 
the evidence” (Stanford, 2006: 20). On this account, present theories are not just 
unwarranted, but false. In other words, the PUA asserts not just that we should be agnostic 
about current theories, but rather that they are false. In addition, P. Kyle Stanford (2006: 133) 
claims that there are an unlimited number of theories. Samuel Ruhmkorff (2011) replies that 
there are a limited number of theories. This section tackles the PUA under both conditions.  
Suppose that there are a limited number of theories. Under this condition, realists can 
argue that scientists have removed enough false theories, and that they do not need to remove 
more false theories from the possibility space of theories, so present theories must be true. 
Pessimists would object that scientists have not yet removed enough false theories, so present 
theories must be false. On the pessimist account, scientists need to remove more false 
theories, including current theories, before arriving at true theories. Note that the realists’ and 
pessimists’ positions confront each other (Park, 2019: Section 3.1). 
In this context, the EVR can help realists. According to the EVR, in the absence of an 
argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve T, we can rationally believe T. Pessimists 
do not have an argument that rationally compels realists to disbelieve that scientists have 
pulled out enough false theories from the space of alternatives. It follows that realists can 
rationally believe that scientists have pulled out enough false theories, and that current 
theories must be true. To block realists from rationally believing so, they should present an 
argument that rationally compels realists to disbelieve so. Thus, the EVR acts as a burden-
shifter for realists. 
Suppose that there are an unlimited number of theories. Under this condition, realists 
can argue that there are two possibility spaces: the possibility space of true theories, and the 
possibility space of false theories. Realists would admit that scientists pulled past theories 
from the space of false theories. They can, however, argue that scientists have pulled present 
theories from the possibility space of true theories, so present theories must be true. In the 
history of science, scientists have pulled theories from the space of successful theories after 
pulling theories from the space of unsuccessful theories.
3
 So we cannot rule out the 
possibility that scientists have pulled present theories from the space of true theories, 
although they pulled past theories from the space of false theories. Pessimists would retort 
that scientists pulled present theories from the space of false theories, just as they pulled past 
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theories from that space, so present theories must be false too. Note that realists’ and 
pessimists’ positions confront each other (Park, 2019: Section 3.2). 
In this context, the EVR can help realists. Obviously, pessimists do not have an 
argument that rationally compels realists to disbelieve that scientists have pulled present 
theories from the space of true theories. It follows that realists can rationally believe that 
scientists have pulled present theories from the space of true theories, and that present 
theories must be true. To block realists from rationally believing so, they should present an 
argument that rationally compels realists to disbelieve so. Again, the EVR acts as a burden-
shifter for realists. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
5.1. The EVR Proper and the Converse EVR 
The EVR holds that “what it is rational to believe includes anything that one is not rationally 
compelled to disbelieve” (van Fraassen, 1989: 171–172). I claimed in Section 2 that the 
converse aspect of the EVR is that what it is rational to disbelieve includes anything that one 
is not rationally compelled to believe.  
Opponents might raise the following objection. The converse EVR is not equivalent to 
the EVR proper. Neither, for that matter, does the former follow from the latter. It is not 
entirely clear whether this paper uses the former or the latter to support the thesis that the 
EVR can be used to defend scientific realism. If this paper uses not the EVR proper but its 
converse, then the paper fails to achieve the aim declared in the introduction that scientific 
realists can invoke the EVR to overcome scientific antirealists’ objections.4 
Admittedly, the EVR proper and its converse are not equivalent, given that the former 
is about what it is rational to believe while the latter is about what it is rational to disbelieve. 
Suppose that there are T1, T2, and T3, and that we are rationally compelled to believe T1, 
neither to believe nor to disbelieve T2, and to disbelieve T3. The EVR proper implies that we 
can rationally believe T1 and T2, but not T3. By contrast, the converse EVR implies that we 
can rationally disbelieve T2 and T3, but not T1. In short, the EVR proper and the converse 
EVR have different implications for T1, T2, and T3. 
Consider, however, that van Fraassen thinks that there is no argument that rationally 
compels us to believe T1 and to disbelieve T3. It follows that the EVR implies that we can 
rationally believe T1, T2, and T3, and that the converse EVR also implies that we can 
rationally disbelieve T1, T2, and T3. In sum, what it is rational to believe is coextensive with 
what it is rational to disbelieve. Let me add that van Fraassen relies not on the EVR proper 
but rather on the converse EVR to contend that it is rational to disbelieve T. This paper 
operates under his conception of the EVR. 
 
5.2. Abduction and the EVR 
This paper takes for granted van Fraassen’s views about abduction and the EVR. But why 
should abduction be abandoned? Why is the EVR preferable to the PVR?
5
 
Let me introduce what I take to be van Fraassen’s most influential argument against 
abduction called the argument from a bad lot:  
 
So our selection may well be the best of a bad lot. … For me to take it that the best of set X will 
be more likely to be true than not, requires a prior belief that the truth is already more likely to 
be found in X, than not. (van Fraassen, 1989: 143) 
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To put differently, T might compete with theories that we have not yet conceived of. So even 
if it best explains phenomena, i.e., even if it is better than its conceived rivals, we cannot 
conclude that it is true. In order to conclude that it is true, we should first prove that it is 
better than its unconceived competitors. This argument is further developed by James 
Ladyman et al. (1997: 309) and Wray (2008: 321) in the literature. 
Let me turn to the second question above. Van Fraassen does not present any argument 
to show that the EVR is preferable to the PVR. Park (2017: 27) argues, however, that van 
Fraassen needs to show not only that the EVR is better than the PVR but also that the EVR is 
better than the theories of rationality that we have not yet conceived of. In other words, Park 
runs the argument from a bad lot against the EVR.  
Suppose that van Fraassen has constructed an argument to show that the EVR is better 
than the PVR. What would we need to make of it? We would need to determine whether it 
rationally compels us to believe that the EVR is better than the PVR. If it did not have such a 
power, we would be able to rationally disbelieve that the EVR is better than the PVR.  
Van Fraassen needs to show not only that the EVR is better than the PVR but also that 
the EVR is the correct view of rationality. After all, it is one thing to say that the EVR is 
better than the PVR; it is another to say that EVR is the correct view of rationality, as Wray 
(2008: 323) and Mizrahi (2013b: 401) would point out. Moreover, once van Fraassen has 
constructed an argument to show that the EVR is the correct view of rationality, we would 
need to determine whether it rationally compels us to believe that the EVR is the correct view 
of rationality. If it did not have such a power, we would be able to rationally disbelieve that 
the EVR is the correct view of rationality. In addition, we would need to determine whether 
van Fraassen’s argument for the EVR is more powerful than scientists’ arguments for T. He 
disbelieves T on the grounds that scientists’ arguments for T rely on abduction and do not 
rationally compel us to believe T. So if his argument for the EVR relies on abduction, and if 
it is not more powerful than scientists’ arguments for T, we can rationally disbelieve the 
EVR. 
Keep in mind, however, that this paper sets aside all these criticisms against the EVR, 
and that it rather grants that the EVR is the correct view of rationality, as van Fraassen’s 
(2017) paper does. This paper merely uses the EVR to defend realism from antirealist 
objections. 
 
5.3. Belief and Acceptance 
This paper uses the phrases ‘the belief of T’ and ‘the disbelief of T’ many times. What do 
they mean? How do they differ from the acceptance of T?
6
 
L. Jonathan Cohen (1992) famously distinguishes between belief and acceptance. He 
says that to believe T is “to feel it true” (1992: 4), whereas to accept T is to include T “among 
one’s premises for deciding what to do or think in a particular context” (1992: 4). On this 
account, you can use T as a premise without feeling that it is true, i.e., you can accept T 
without believing it. For example, you can use Newtonian mechanics to send a rocket to the 
moon without feeling that it is true, i.e., you can accept Newtonian mechanics to send a 
rocket to the moon without believing it.
7
 
Cohen’s definition of acceptance is similar to that of van Fraassen. According to van 
Fraassen, to accept a theory is to “confront any future phenomena by means of the conceptual 
resources of this theory” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). For example, evolutionary biologists 
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accept evolutionary theory, which means that they confront the biological phenomena in 
terms of evolutionary theory. When they do so, they may believe that evolutionary theory is 
true, empirically adequate, useful, etc. According to scientific realism, “acceptance of a 
scientific theory involves the belief that it is true” (van Fraassen, 1980: 8). By contrast, 
according to constructive empiricism, “acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is 
empirically adequate” (van Fraassen, 1980: 12). So scientific realism and constructive 
empiricism imply that evolutionary biologists believe that evolutionary theory is true and 
empirically adequate, respectively. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Van Fraassen contends that there is no argument that rationally compels us to disbelieve T. 
He has put himself in the ironic situation where he needs to attack antirealists’ favorite 
arguments, such as the pessimistic induction, to show that they do not rationally compel us to 
disbelieve T. He uses the EVR to rationally disbelieve T. In response, realists can use it to 
rationally believe T, despite Müller’s penetrating objection that realists have the burden of 
showing that current theories are sufficiently successful, and despite pessimists’ assertions 
that scientists have not yet removed enough false theories from the space of alternatives, or 
that scientists pulled present theories from the space of false theories. I conclude this paper 
with a motto: “Realists welcome the EVR.” 
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